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Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution removes all detector-side attacks in
quantum cryptography, and in the meantime doubles the secure distance. The source side, however,
is still vulnerable to various attacks. In particular, the continuous phase randomization assumption
on the source side is normally not fulfilled in experimental implementation and may potentially
open a loophole. In this work, we first show that indeed there are loopholes for imperfect phase ran-
domization in measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution by providing a concrete
attack. Then we propose a discrete-phase-randomized measurement-device-independent quantum
key distribution protocol as a solution to close this source-side loophole.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides an
information-theoretically secure method to distribute
identical keys between two parties, and is hence one of the
most important ingredients in information-theoretically
secure communication. The first QKD protocol was de-
veloped by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [1], which con-
sisted of two sides, a source side and a detector side. We
refer to this protocol as BB84 hereafter. The security
of BB84, however, relies on a few idealized assumptions.
These assumptions are often violated in practice, which
allows attacks mostly on the detector side. Measurement-
device-independent (MDI) QKD is hence developed to
close all loopholes on the detector side [2]. To achieve
higher security, it is ideal to also close loopholes on the
source side in MDI-QKD.
In an idealized MDI-QKD, each of the two parties,
called Alice and Bob, provide single photons in the eigen-
states of the rectilinear basis or the diagonal bases. The
measurement device performs a Bell measurement on Al-
ice’s and Bob’s signals. It can be shown that if both
Alice and Bob choose the rectilinear basis, they can re-
cover identical keys based on the Bell measurement out-
comes. The events that Alice and Bob choose different
bases are discarded. It was shown that the security of
this protocol can be proved by treating the protocol as
the time-reversed version of an entanglement-based QKD
[3].
In a practical scenario, single photon sources are not
available. Instead, a phase-randomized weak coherent
laser is often utilized to approximate a single photon
source. However, continuous phase randomization is im-
possible to be realized experimentally. Heuristically, the
laser is turned off and then on again to approximate
phase randomization, but there is no theoretical guar-
antee that this can provide perfect phase randomization.
∗ caozhu@ecust.edu.cn
Indeed there is evidence that this method is far from per-
fect phase randomization [4].
Failure in phase randomization can yield the QKD sys-
tem insecure with respect to the original security analy-
sis. In a related work [5], it was shown that the phase
randomization loophole in BB84 can be closed by using
discrete phase randomization. Inspired by that work, we
propose a discrete-phase-randomized (DPR) MDI-QKD
protocol for solving the phase randomization loophole
in MDI-QKD. In addition, we provide a formal security
proof of the DPR MDI-QKD protocol.
The roadmap for the rest of the paper is as follows. In
Sec. II, we first provide a brief review of the MDI-QKD
protocol. In Sec. III, we show an attack against a MDI-
QKD system with imperfect phase randomization. In
Sec. IV, we describe the DPR MDI-QKD protocol and
provide its security analysis. In Sec. V, we summarize
the results and discuss future work.
II. REVIEW OF MDI-QKD
A diagram of the MDI-QKD protocol is shown in
Fig. 1. In a typical MDI-QKD setup, Alice and Bob pre-
pare source states in the rectilinear basis or in the diago-
nal basis. A measurement device which may be controlled
by Eve performs a joint Bell measurement on Alice’s and
Bob’s states, and outputs either |01〉+ |10〉 or |01〉− |10〉
(other Bell measurement outcomes are discarded). After-
wards, Alice and Bob announce the bases they used and
discard the events that they use different bases. It can
be shown that if both Alice and Bob were using the rec-
tilinear basis with different (the same) eigenstates, the
measurement result is always |01〉 − |10〉 (|01〉 + |10〉).
If both parties were using the diagonal bases, then out-
putting |01〉 + |10〉 and |01〉 − |10〉 will have the same
probability 0.5. By these properties, Alice and Bob can
use the rectilinear basis to generate keys, and use the di-
agonal basis to estimate the errors in the measurement
device. In addition, the two parties use the decoy state
method [6–8] to estimate the channel gain and error rate
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2with higher precision. The MDI-QKD protocol can be
viewed as a time-reversed version of an entanglement-
based QKD protocol [3] and indeed its security can be
proved using this time-reversal symmetry [2].
FIG. 1. Diagram of the MDI-QKD protocol. There are three
modules, including Alice, Bob and Eve. Alice and Bob gener-
ate source states, whereas the measurement device controlled
by Eve performs a joint measurement on the states of Alice
and Bob. Here, WCP stands for a weak coherent source; PM
stands for a phase modulator; Decoy-IM stands for an inten-
sity modulator that switches between the signal states and
the decoy states. Conv is a converter that converts the phase
encoding to the polarization encoding [9]; BS is a beam split-
ter; PBS is a polarization beam splitter; D1H , D1V , D2H ,
D2V are single-photon detectors.
III. VULNERABILITY OF IMPERFECT PHASE
RANDOMIZATION
In this section, we propose an attack to show that there
is a serious loophole in MDI-QKD if the phase of the co-
herent source is not properly randomized. For simplicity,
we consider the extreme case that there is no phase ran-
domization, and the phases of the signal state and the
decoy state are known to the eavesdropper Eve. We now
describe how to use unambiguous state discrimination
(USD) to attack a MDI-QKD system without phase ran-
domization.
In the first step, Eve uses USD to distinguish the signal
state and the decoy state on both Alice’s and Bob’s sides,
each with some probability q (note that in the case of
perfect phase randomization, Eve cannot distinguish the
signal state and the decoy state, i.e., q = 0). Eve discards
the events that he fails to distinguish the signal state and
the decoy state. Then Eve measures the photon number
and chooses to forward some of the photons conditioned
on the results of signal or decoy states and the photon
number to preserve the channel statistics.
In a normal MDI-QKD, the key rate is lower bounded
by
Rl = −QRectf(ERect)H(ERect) +Q1,1n (1−H(E1,1,bDiag)),
(1)
where the first term is the error correction term and
the second term is the privacy amplification term. Here
QRect is the gain of the rectilinear basis, ERect is the
bit error rate of the rectilinear basis, Q1,1n is the esti-
mated gain when both parities emit single-photon states,
f(·) ≥ 1 is the error correction efficiency, E1,1,bDiag is the bit
error rate of the diagonal basis, and H(·) is the binary
Shannon entropy. Under the attack, the key rate is up-
per bounded by Ru = Q1,1a where Q
1,1
a is the actual gain
of the single photon states from both parities under the
attack. Apparently, if Rl > R
u, then Alice and Bob
would mistakenly generate keys with a key rate higher
than the maximal secure key rate possible under the at-
tack, thus leaking part of the key information to Eve.
The goal of Eve is hence to minimize Ru to the extent
that it is smaller than Rl. We next show that this indeed
can happen.
Suppose the intensities of the signal state and the de-
coy state are µ and ν respectively, it can be shown [10]
that on each side, the optimal success probability of un-
ambiguous state discrimination is
qopt = 1− exp(−
|√µ−√ν|2
4
). (2)
In the attack, the gains of the signal state and the decoy
state at each side are
Qµ =
∞∑
i=1
qoptZ
µ
i e
−µµ
i
i!
,
Qν =
∞∑
i=1
qoptZ
ν
i e
−ν ν
i
i!
(3)
respectively, where Zµi (Z
ν
i ) is the probability of Eve for-
warding the photons conditioned on the signal state (the
decoy state) and the photon number i. Here we make the
simplified assumption that the dark count is zero, so the
summation index starts from 1.
Eve should choose Zµi and Z
ν
i properly so that his
faked gains match the normal channel gains of both the
signal state and the decoy state, namely,
Qµ = 1− e−ηµ,
Qν = 1− e−ην . (4)
3Here η is the channel loss and we assume there is no dark
count for simplicity. In addition, since
Ru = Q1,1a = (qµZ
µ
1 e
−µµ)2, (5)
minimizing Ru is equivalent to minimizing Zµ1 .
Assume µ 1 and µ > ν > µ2/2 and let η = qoptµ/2,
we can take
Zµ2 = 1,
Zν1 = µ
2/2ν,
Zµi = 0 ∀i 6= 2, (6)
Zνi = 0 ∀i 6= 1.
For these parameters, it can be checked that the con-
straints Eqs. (3) to (4) are satisfied. Hence we have
Zµ1 = 0, thus R
u = 0, meaning that all the key infor-
mation is leaked to Eve. It only remains to show that
Rl > 0 for these parameters.
For simplicity, we assume there are no errors, namely
Eµ = 0. The estimated key rate lower bound R
l is then
reduced to Q1,1n . In a normal estimation, since Eve can-
not distinguish the signal state and the decoy state, we
have
Qµ,µ =
∞∑
i.j=1
Yi,je
−µµ
i
i!
e−µ
µj
j!
,
Qν,µ =
∞∑
i,j=1
Yi,je
−ν ν
i
i!
e−µ
µj
j!
,
Qµ,ν =
∞∑
i,j=1
Yi,je
−µµ
i
i!
e−ν
νj
j!
, (7)
Qµ,µ =
∞∑
i.j=1
Yi,je
−µµ
i
i!
e−µ
µj
j!
.
Here Qα,β stands for the gain when the mean photon
number of Alice’s state is α and the mean photon num-
ber of Bob’s state is β, Yi,j stands for the gain when
Alice’s state contains i photon and Bob’s state contains
j photons. Since Alice and Bob send their states inde-
pendently, we have Qα,β = QαQβ , where Qα and Qβ are
given by Eq. (4).
By a two-step estimation, we first estimate the inter-
mediate quantities Y 1µ and Y
1
ν defined by
Y 1µ =
∞∑
i=1
Y1,ie
−µµ
i
i!
,
Y 1ν =
∞∑
i=1
Y1,ie
−ν ν
i
i!
. (8)
Using Eq. (7), Y 1µ can be estimated from Qµ,µ and Qν,µ
as
Y 1µ ≥
µ
µν − ν2 (Qν,µe
ν −Qµ,µeµ ν
2
µ2
)
≈ η2µ, (9)
and similarly for Y 1ν , we have
Y 1ν ≈ η2ν. (10)
Finally, by Eqs. (8) to (10), Y1,1 can be estimated as
Y1,1 ≥ µ
µν − ν2 (Y
1
ν e
ν − Y 1µ eµ
ν2
µ2
)
≈ η2. (11)
Thus Rl = Q1,1 = Y1,1(e
−µµ)2 > 0 = Ru, which shows
that Eve’s attack is successful.
It should be noted that this example is not the only
case that Eve can successfully attack a MDI-QKD sys-
tem without phase randomization. The exact parameter
region which is vulnerable to Eve’s attack is beyond the
scope of this paper, and is left as an interesting future
research direction.
IV. DISCRETE-PHASE-RANDOMIZED
MDI-QKD PROTOCOL
In this section, we first describe our discrete-phase-
randomized MDI-QKD protocol and then provide its se-
curity analysis.
A weak coherent laser can be described by the following
state [11]
|α〉 = e− |α|
2
2
∑ αn√
n!
|n〉, (12)
where α is a complex number and |n〉 is the Fock state of
n photons. In continuous phase randomization, a random
phase θ ∈ [0, 2pi) is applied on |α〉, and the input state
becomes
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
∣∣αeiθ〉〈αeiθ∣∣dθ = ∞∑
n=0
e−|α|
2 |α|2
n!
|n〉〈n|. (13)
Conditioning on sufficiently small |α| and photon de-
tection, this input state approximates the single photon
state |1〉〈1| quite well and hence is a good substitute for
a single photon source.
In contrast to continuous phase randomization, in our
discrete-phase-randomized MDI-QKD protocol, we apply
one of the discrete phases
{θk = 2pik
N
|k = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1} (14)
randomly on the weak coherent laser
∣∣√2α〉. Here N
is the number of discrete phases. Using the virtual qu-
dit formalism of randomization, the input state can be
written as
|ΨN 〉 =
N−1∑
k=0
|ak〉A
∣∣√2αe2kpii/N〉
B
(15)
=
N−1∑
j=0
|bj〉A|λj〉B ,
4where
|λj〉 =
N−1∑
k=0
e−2kjpii/N
∣∣e2kpii/N√2α〉. (16)
Here {|ak〉}k=0,1,...,N−1 and {|bj〉}j=0,1,...,N−1 are sets of
orthogonal bases, and |ak〉 can be transformed from |bj〉
by
|ak〉 =
N−1∑
j=0
e−2kjpii/N |bj〉. (17)
By Taylor expansion on |λj〉, one has
|λj〉 =
∞∑
l=0
(
√
2α)lN+j√
(lN + j)!
|lN + j〉. (18)
The probability of obtaining |λj〉 is
Pj =
〈λj |λj〉∑N−1
j=0 〈λj |λj〉
=
∞∑
l=0
µlN+je−µ
(lN + j)!
, (19)
where µ = 2|α|2. It can be seen that as N goes to infinity,
|λj〉 approaches the Fock state |j〉. Therefore we will call
|λj〉 the approximated j-photon state.
The input state |λj〉 is then encoded into four BB84
states with the phase encoding and becomes one of
∣∣0Lx 〉 = N−1∑
k=0
e−2kjpii/N
∣∣e2kpii/Nα〉∣∣e2kpii/Nα〉,
∣∣1Lx 〉 = N−1∑
k=0
e−2kjpii/N
∣∣e2kpii/Nα〉∣∣−e2kpii/Nα〉,
∣∣0Ly 〉 = N−1∑
k=0
e−2kjpii/N
∣∣e2kpii/Nα〉∣∣ie2kpii/Nα〉, (20)
∣∣1Ly 〉 = N−1∑
k=0
e−2kjpii/N
∣∣e2kpii/Nα〉∣∣−ie2kpii/Nα〉,
where
∣∣0Lx 〉 and ∣∣1Lx 〉 are logical qubits in the X basis,
and
∣∣0Ly 〉 and ∣∣1Ly 〉 are logical qubits in the Y basis, the
first coherent state is the reference state and the second
coherent state is the signal state with BB84 phases. Since
the probabilities of choosing the eigenstates are equal, the
overall states encoded in the X basis and the Y basis are
ρXAB = (
∣∣0Lx 〉〈0Lx ∣∣+ ∣∣1Lx 〉〈1Lx ∣∣)A ⊗ (∣∣0Lx 〉〈0Lx ∣∣+ ∣∣1Lx 〉〈1Lx ∣∣)B ,
ρYAB = (
∣∣0Ly 〉〈0Ly ∣∣+ ∣∣1Ly 〉〈1Ly ∣∣)A ⊗ (∣∣0Ly 〉〈0Ly ∣∣+ ∣∣1Ly 〉〈1Ly ∣∣)B ,
(21)
respectively. In the ideal case of basis-independent
sources, we have
ρXAB = ρ
Y
AB . (22)
We can characterize the deviation from the ideal case by
bounding the fidelity between ρXAB and ρ
Y
AB as
Fj,j(ρ
X
AB , ρ
Y
AB) = tr
√√
ρYABρ
X
AB
√
ρYAB (23)
≥
∣∣∣∣∣∑∞l=0 µlN+j(lN+j)! 2−
lN+j
2 (cos lN+j4 pi+sin
lN+j
4 pi)∑∞
l=0
µlN+j
(lN+j)!
∣∣∣∣∣
2
.
The concrete derivation can be found in Appendix A.
The first order approximation of F1,1 with respect to µ
N
is
F
(1)
1,1 ≥ 1− 2
(
1− 2−N2 cos N
4
pi
)
µN
(N + 1)!
. (24)
This will be later used in the key rate formula. Its deriva-
tion can also be found in Appendix A.
A. Key rate
In a normal MDI-QKD, the key rate formula is given
by Eq. (1). In the discrete phase version, we need to
modify the key rate formula to
R ≥ −QRectf(ERect)H(ERect)
+
∑
i
∑
j
PiPjYi,j [1−H(Ei,j,pRect)]. (25)
The error correction part stays unchanged. For the pri-
vacy amplification part, Pi is the probability of obtaining
the state |λi〉 when a party uses a signal state, Yi,j and
Ei,j,pRect are the gain and the phase error rate of the recti-
linear basis when Alice’s state is |λi〉, Bob’s state is |λj〉
and both parties use signal states.
Recall that a phase error of the rectilinear basis occurs
when Alice and Bob’s states are both encoded in the X
basis, and their joint state after the Bell measurement is∣∣0Lx 〉A∣∣0Lx 〉B+∣∣1Lx 〉A∣∣1Lx 〉B instead of the correct outcome∣∣0Lx 〉A∣∣0Lx 〉B − ∣∣1Lx 〉A∣∣1Lx 〉B . If their joint state after the
Bell measurement is
∣∣0Lx 〉A∣∣1Lx 〉B − ∣∣0Lx 〉A∣∣1Lx 〉B , a bit er-
ror of the rectilinear basis is said to occur. Similarly, for
the diagonal basis where Alice and Bob’s states are both
encoded in the Y basis, the correct outcome after the
Bell measurement should be
∣∣0Ly 〉A∣∣0Ly 〉B − ∣∣1Ly 〉A∣∣1Ly 〉B .
If the actual joint state is
∣∣0Ly 〉A∣∣0Ly 〉B + ∣∣1Ly 〉A∣∣1Ly 〉B , a
phase error of the diagonal basis is said to occur. If the
actual joint state is
∣∣0Ly 〉A∣∣1Ly 〉B−∣∣1Ly 〉A∣∣0Ly 〉B , a bit error
of the diagonal basis is said to occur.
In the key formula, since QRect and ERect can be di-
rectly measured, only Yi,j and E
i,j,p
Rect need to be esti-
mated. In the basis-independent case, E1,1,pRect = E
1,1,b
Diag ,
hence the phase error of the rectilinear basis can be esti-
mated using the bit error rate of the diagonal basis. How-
ever, in the discrete phase case, the basis independence
property no longer holds. Fortunately, we can estimate
5the difference between eb1,1 = E
1,1,b
Diag and e
p
1,1 = E
1,1,p
Rect as
follows [12],
epj,j ≤ ebj,j + 4∆j,j(1−∆j,j)(1− 2ebj,j)
+ 4(1− 2∆j,j)
√
∆j,j(1−∆j,j)ebj,j(1− ebj,j),(26)
where
∆j,j =
1− Fj,j
2Yj,j
. (27)
Here Fj,j is given by Eq. (23). Next we show how to
estimate the parameters Y1,1 and e
b
1,1.
B. Parameter estimation
In discrete-phase-randomized MDI-QKD, we need to
estimate the gain Y α,βi,j and the error rate e
α,β
i,j . First we
note that the following relations hold:
Qα,β =
N−1∑
i,j=0
Pαi P
β
j Y
α,β
i,j ,
Qα,βEα,β =
N−1∑
i,j=0
Pαi P
β
j Y
α,β
i,j e
α,β
i,j , (28)
where α(β) distinguishes the signal state and the de-
coy states, i(j) stands for the approximated i-photon(j-
photon) state, Qα,β and Eα,β are the observed gain and
error rate in the case that Alice uses the intensity set-
ting α and Bob uses the intensity setting β, Y α,βi,j and
eα,βi,j are the intrinsic gain and error rate in the case that
Alice uses the intensity setting α and the approximated
i-photon state, Bob uses the intensity setting β and the
approximated j-photon state, Pαi is the probability of
generating an approximated i-photon state when the in-
tensity setting is α.
There is an inherent assumption in normal MDI-QKD,
namely
Y α1,β1i,j = Y
α2,β2
i,j ,
eα1,β1i,j = e
α2,β2
i,j . (29)
This no longer holds in the case of discrete phase ran-
domization as ∣∣∣λα1,β1i,j 〉 6= ∣∣∣λα2,β2i,j 〉, (30)
where
∣∣∣λα,βi,j 〉 is the joint state of Alice and Bob when
Alice uses the intensity setting α together with the ap-
proximated i-photon state, and Bob uses the intensity
setting β together with the approximated j-photon state.
Nevertheless, we can bound the difference between gains
and errors of different intensities as
|Y α,µi,j − Y α,νi,j | ≤
√
1− F 2µν ,
|Y α,µi,j eα,µi,j − Y α,νi,j eα,νi,j | ≤
√
1− F 2µν , (31)
where
Fµν =
∑∞
l=0
(µν)lN/2
(lN)!√∑∞
l=0
µlN
(lN)!
∑∞
l=0
νlN
(lN)!
. (32)
The derivation of these bounds can be found in Appendix
B.
The estimation of the gain Y α,βi,j and the error rate
eα,βi,j is similar to normal MDI-QKD. We start with the
estimation of the gain Y α,βi,j . Note that the first equation
in Eq. (28) can be rewritten as
Qα,β =
N−1∑
i=0
Pαi Y
α,β
i , (33)
where
Y α,βi =
N−1∑
j=0
P βj Y
α,β
i,j . (34)
For notation simplicity, let
 =
√
1− F 2µν . (35)
From Eq. (34), we get
|Y α,βi − Y µ,βi | = |
N−1∑
j=0
P βj (Y
α,β
i,j − Y µ,βi,j )|
≤
N−1∑
j=0
P βj |Y α,βi,j − Y µ,βi,j | (36)
≤
N−1∑
j=0
P βj  = ,
where the last inequality holds because
∑N−1
j=0 P
β
j = 1.
Hence, we can estimate the upper bound and the lower
bound of Y µ,βi under the following constraint,
Qµ,β =
N−1∑
i=0
Pµi Y
µ,β
i ,
Qα,β =
N−1∑
i=0
Pαi Y
α,β
i =
N−1∑
i=0
Pαi Y
µ,β
i ± , (37)
0 ≤ Y µ,βi ≤ 1.
After the range of Y µ,βi is estimated for all β, we can
estimate the upper bound and the lower bound of Y µ,µi,j
under the following constraint:
Y µ,µi =
N−1∑
j=0
Pµj Y
µ,µ
i,j ,
Y µ,βi =
N−1∑
j=0
P βj Y
µ,β
i,j =
N−1∑
j=0
P βj Y
µ,µ
i,j ± , (38)
0 ≤ Y µ,µi,j ≤ 1.
6The estimation of Y α,βi,j e
α,β
i,j is almost identical to the
estimation of Y α,βi,j . We can rewrite the second equation
in Eq. (28) as
Qα,βEα,β =
N−1∑
i
Pαi W
α,β
i , (39)
where
Wα,βi =
N−1∑
j=0
P βj Y
α,β
i,j e
α,β
i,j . (40)
From Eq. (40), we get
|Wα,βi −Wµ,βi | = |
N−1∑
j=0
P βj (Y
α,β
i,j e
α,β
i,j − Y µ,βi,j eµ,βi,j )|
≤
N−1∑
j=0
P βj |Y α,βi,j eα,βi,j − Y µ,βi,j eµ,βi,j | (41)
≤
N−1∑
j=0
P βj  = .
Hence, we can estimate the upper bound and the lower
bound of Wµ,βi under the following constraint:
Qµ,βEµ,β =
N−1∑
i=0
Pµi W
µ,β
i ,
Qα,βEα,β =
N−1∑
i=0
Pαi W
α,β
i =
N−1∑
i=0
Pαi W
µ,β
i ± , (42)
0 ≤Wµ,βi ≤ 1.
After the range of Wµ,βi is estimated for all β, we can es-
timate the upper bound and the lower bound of Y µ,µi,j e
µ,µ
i,j
under the following constraint:
Wµ,µi =
N−1∑
j=0
Pµj Y
µ,µ
i,j e
µ,µ
i,j ,
Wµ,βi =
N−1∑
j=0
P βj Y
µ,β
i,j e
µ,β
i,j =
N−1∑
j=0
P βj Y
µ,µ
i,j e
µ,µ
i,j ± , (43)
0 ≤ Y µ,µi,j eµ,µi,j ≤ 1.
This completes the parameter estimation of the discrete-
phase-randomized MDI-QKD protocol.
Each linear system presented in this section can be effi-
ciently solved through linear programming. When there
are M decoy states, each linear system contains N vari-
ables and 2N + 2M + 1 constraints. Hence, the com-
putation of its solution is manageable when N is small
(e.g., N < 20). When N is large (e.g., N > 10 000), the
computation time can be infeasibly long. In that case,
one method to accelerate the computation at a cost of a
small decrease in performance is that we keep only vari-
ables with the lowest K indices, such as Y µ,β0 , . . . , Y
µ,β
K−1,
and relax other variables to 0 or 1 in all constraining
equations and inequalities. The reduced linear system
then contains K variables and 2K + 2M + 2 constraints.
In later simulations, we take M = 2 and K = 3. Larger
values of M and K can lead to more accurate estimation
of the parameters.
C. Simulation result
In Fig. 2, we plot the key rate of continuous randomiza-
tion (annotated as “random phases”) and various number
of discrete phases (9, 10, 11, 12, 14 phases, respectively)
under different transmission distances. It can be seen
that 14 phases already approximate continuous phase
randomization quite well. The detailed simulation model
and simulation parameters are shown in Appendix C.
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FIG. 2. The relation between the key rate and the trans-
mission distance for continuously random phases and discrete
phases. The dashed line is the key rate for continuously ran-
dom phases and the solid lines from left to right are for 9, 10,
11, 12, and 14 discrete phases, respectively.
With the same simulation model, we plot the key
rate of continuous randomization (annotated as “random
phases”) and various number of discrete phases (9, 10, 11,
12, 14 phases, respectively) under different noise levels
eb1,1 in Fig. 3. It can be seen that the security threshold
(maximally tolerable noise) of 14 phases is already very
close to that of continuous phase randomization, which
is about 8.7%.
In a practical experiment, the deviation of experimen-
tal parameters from the simulation parameters used here
should be accounted for by substituting the actual ex-
perimental parameters into the simulation model, and
the selection of the number of discrete phases should be
determined through this revized simulation.
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FIG. 3. The relation between the key rate and the noise level
for continuously random phases and discrete phases. The
dashed line is the key rate for continuously random phases
and the solid lines from left to right are for 9, 10, 11, 12, and
14 discrete phases, respectively.
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, we showed that MDI-QKD with im-
perfect phase randomization is vulnerable to attacks
and, as a solution, proposed a discrete-phase-randomized
measurement-device-independent quantum key distribu-
tion protocol. We also provided a security proof of the
protocol. Simulation results confirm that the protocol
with only a few phases (14 phases) already approximates
continuous phase randomization quite well.
As future work, we can consider further source imper-
fection in measurement-device-independent quantum key
distribution. One direction is to consider imperfectly pre-
pared discrete phases {∣∣αei(2pik/N±δ)〉}k=1,...,N , where δ
is a small quantity characterizing the deviation from the
exact discrete phases. One can modify the fidelity calcu-
lation to accommodate for this change. Another direction
is to extend our analysis to other MDI protocols requir-
ing weak coherent sources, such as MDI entanglement
witness [13].
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Appendix A: Fidelity Calculation
In this section, we will provide the details on the calcu-
lation of the fidelity between the input states prepared in
different bases. We will utilize a few results from Ref. [5].
By Eqs. (21) and (23) in the main text, we have
Fj,j(ρ
X
AB , ρ
Y
AB)
= F ((
∣∣0Lx 〉〈0Lx ∣∣+ ∣∣1Lx 〉〈1Lx ∣∣)A ⊗ (∣∣0Lx 〉〈0Lx ∣∣+ ∣∣1Lx 〉〈1Lx ∣∣)B ,
(
∣∣0Ly 〉〈0Ly ∣∣+ ∣∣1Ly 〉〈1Ly ∣∣)A ⊗ (∣∣0Ly 〉〈0Ly ∣∣+ ∣∣1Ly 〉〈1Ly ∣∣)B)
= F (
∣∣0Lx 〉〈0Lx ∣∣+ ∣∣1Lx 〉〈1Lx ∣∣, ∣∣0Ly 〉〈0Ly ∣∣+ ∣∣1Ly 〉〈1Ly ∣∣)2 (A1)
In Ref. [5], it was shown that
F (
∣∣0Lx 〉〈0Lx ∣∣+ ∣∣1Lx 〉〈1Lx ∣∣, ∣∣0Ly 〉〈0Ly ∣∣+ ∣∣1Ly 〉〈1Ly ∣∣) (A2)
≥
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑∞
l=0
µlN+j
(lN+j)!2
− lN+j2
(
cos lN+j4 pi + sin
lN+j
4 pi
)
∑∞
l=0
µlN+j
(lN+j)!
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
Thus Eq. (23) in the main text holds.
In addition, in Ref. [5], it was shown that∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑∞
l=0
µlN+j
(lN+j)!2
− lN+j2
(
cos lN+j4 pi + sin
lN+j
4 pi
)
∑∞
l=0
µlN+j
(lN+j)!
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≥ 1−
(
1− 2−N2 cos N
4
pi
)
µN
(N + 1)!
. (A3)
So we have
Fj,j(ρ
X
AB , ρ
Y
AB)
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑∞
l=0
µlN+j
(lN+j)!2
− lN+j2
(
cos lN+j4 pi + sin
lN+j
4 pi
)
∑∞
l=0
µlN+j
(lN+j)!
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≥
(
1−
(
1− 2−N2 cos N
4
pi
)
µN
(N + 1)!
)2
(A4)
≥ 1− 2
(
1− 2−N2 cos N
4
pi
)
µN
(N + 1)!
.
Hence, the first-order approximation of the fidelity in the
main text is proved.
Appendix B: Decoy-State Parameter Deviation
In this section, we show the details on the deviation of
decoy state gain and error rate. Like the previous section,
here we will also utilizes some results from Ref. [5].
By the quantum coin idea [14], we have√
Y α,µi,j Y
α,ν
i,j +
√
(1− Y α,µi,j )(1− Y α,νi,j )
≥ F (|λαi 〉
∣∣λµj 〉, |λαi 〉∣∣λνj 〉),√
Y α,µi,j e
α,µ
i,j Y
α,ν
i,j e
α,ν
i,j +
√
(1− Y α,µi,j eα,µi,j )(1− Y α,νi,j eα,νi,j )
≥ F (|λαi 〉
∣∣λµj 〉, |λαi 〉∣∣λνj 〉). (B1)
The right-hand side can be simplified as
F (|λαi 〉
∣∣λµj 〉, |λαi 〉∣∣λνj 〉) = F (∣∣λµj 〉, ∣∣λνj 〉) ≥ Fµν . (B2)
The first inequality is because the first systems of the two
states are identical, and the second inequality was shown
in Ref. [5].
8Hence√
Y α,µi,j Y
α,ν
i,j +
√
(1− Y α,µi,j )(1− Y α,νi,j ) ≥ Fµν ,√
Y α,µi,j e
α,µ
i,j Y
α,ν
i,j e
α,ν
i,j +
√
(1− Y α,µi,j eα,µi,j )(1− Y α,νi,j eα,νi,j )
≥ Fµν . (B3)
In Ref. [5], it was shown that if
√
xy +
√
(1− x)(1− y) ≥ Fµν , (B4)
then
|x− y| ≤
√
1− F 2µν . (B5)
Hence we have
|Y α,µi,j − Y α,νi,j | ≤
√
1− F 2µν , (B6)
|Y α,µi,j eα,µi,j − Y α,νi,j eα,νi,j | ≤
√
1− F 2µν .
This finishes the proof.
Appendix C: Simulation
In this section, we describe our simulation model and
calculate the key rate.
In the simulation model, we have
η = 10−α1L/10η1
Qµν = (Y0 + 1− e−ηµ)(Y0 + 1− e−ην), (C1)
EµνQµν = Y0(Y0 + 2− e−ηµ − e−ην)/2
+ed(1− e−ηµ)(1− e−ην),
where L is the transmission distance, η is the total trans-
mission loss. For simplicity, we use three states on each
side, namely the signal state, decoy state, and vacuum
state, denoted as 1,2,3 on Alice’s side, and 4,5,6 on Bob’s
side.
The simulation parameters are as follows: The fiber
loss is α1 = 0.2 db/km. Other losses excluding the fibre
loss is η1 = 0.045. The misalignment error rate is ed =
0.033. The error correction efficiency is f = 1.16. The
dark count is Y0 = 1.7× 10−6.
To estimate the gain and the error rate, we exploit
Eqs. (28) to (43) in the main text. Then the intensities
of the signal state and the decoy state are optimized to
maximize the key rate.
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